Educating the Public on Evidence-based methods for improving inter-group civility.

“In-Group Love” without “Out-Group Hate”

“In-Group Love” without “Out-Group Hate”

        Two types of economic games were introduced: the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma game (IPD) and the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing Difference game (IPD-MD). In the IPD game participants allocated tokens between a pool for themselves and a between-group pool (pool B). In the IPD-MD game participants allocated tokens among a pool for themselves, pool B and a within-group pool (pool W). As shown in the pay-off matrices below, a token allocated in pool B will benefit everyone in the group and harm the other group while a token allocated in pool W will benefit everyone in the group without harming the other group. The optimal strategy for individual would be keeping all tokens for themselves. In the IPD game, the optimal strategy for the group would be putting all tokens in pool B. However, if the other group do the same, both groups will gain nothing. In the IPD-MD game contributing to pool W makes a group gain without intergroup competition, but there is no guarantee the other group would do the same.

IPD-MD Payoff Matrix

IPD payoff matrix

1. What They Did – Intervention Summary:

       Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions. In the IPD-MD condition participants played IPD-MD game for 60 rounds. In the IPD condition participants played IPD game for 30 rounds and then IPD-MD game for another 30 rounds. All decisions were made in private using a computer. Participants played in a group of 3 against another group of 3.  Group composition and group matching were kept constant throughout the study. At the end of the study participants were paid for every points they earned.

 2. What They Found – Results:

       For the IPD-MD condition, as can be seen in the picture below, participants contributed on average 31.54% of their endowment to pool W, as compared with only 5.25% to pool B. The rest of the endowment (63.20%) was kept for private use. For the IPD condition, in the first (IPD) part of the interaction, the rate of contribution to pool B was 26.50%. In the second (IPD-MD) part, despite the competition in the first part, the contribution rate to pool B dropped to 5.72%. The present experiment established that out-group hate does not evolve spontaneously in interaction between randomly composed groups, not even after a period of intergroup conflict.

IPD

 3. Who Was Studied – Sample:

Undergraduate Students

 4. Study Name:

Halevy et al., 2012

 5. Citation:

Halevy, N., Weisel, O., & Bornstein, G. (2012). “In‐Group Love” and “Out‐Group Hate” in Repeated Interaction Between Groups. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(2), 188-195.

 6. Link:

http://www.econ.mpg.de/files/2012/staff/Weisel_JBDM_2011.pdf

 7. Intervention categories:

An opportunity to show ingroup love without outgroup hate

 8. Sample size:

144

 9. Central Reported Statistic:

In the IPD condition, a repeated measure ANOVA with block as a within-subject variable and contribution to pool B as the dependent variable found a highly significant block effect (F(3,33)=25.80, p<.001).

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Mechanistic Explanation Reduces Political Extremity Among Extremists

Mechanistic Explanation Reduces Political Extremity Among Extremists

 1. What They Did – Intervention Summary:

Participants first provided their position on the six policies. They were then assigned to one of four conditions and asked to elaborate on one of two policies: cap and trade or flat tax. Depending on condition, participants were asked either to generate a mechanistic explanation or to enumerate reasons for their position. Next, participants were told that they would receive a bonus payment (20 cents; equal to 20% of their compensation for completing the experiment) and that they had four options for what they could do with this bonus payment. They could (a) donate it to a group that advocated in favor of the issue in question, (b) donate it to a group that advocated against the issue, (c) keep the money for themselves (after answering a few additional questions), or (d) turn it down.

The researchers tried to reduce political extremity by asking participants to elaborate with causal links. In the reason generation condition, participants were asked to write down all the reasons they have for their position on a policy, going from the most important to the least. In the mechanistic explanation condition, participants were asked to describe all the details they know about a policy, going from the first step to the last, and providing the causal connection between the steps.

2. What They Found – Results:

              Among participants who initially held a strong position, attempting to generate a mechanistic explanation attenuated their positions, thereby making them less likely to donate. On the other hand, enumerating reasons did not have the same moderating effect as mechanistic explanation.

3. Who Was Studied- Sample:

U.S. residents from MTurk

4. Study Name:

Fernbach et al., 2013, Study 3

5. Citation:

Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R., & Sloman, S. A. (2013). Political extremism is supported by an illusion of understanding. Psychological science, 0956797612464058.

6. Link:

http://www.meteo.mcgill.ca/~huardda/articles/fernbach13.pdf

7. Intervention categories:

generating mechanistic explanation

8. Sample size:

101

9. Central Reported Statistic:

              As predicted, there was a significant interaction between initial extremity of policy support and condition, Waldman’s χ2(1) = 6.05, p = .014. At the lowest level of initial support, there was no difference in likelihood of donating between the mechanism and reasons conditions, Waldman’s χ2(1) = 1.78, p > .18, but at the highest level of initial support, participants in the reasons condition were more likely to donate than were those in the mechanism condition, Waldman’s χ2(1) = 6.74, p < .01.

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10. Effect Size:

Not reported

Study summary assignments:

Zhang Li

 

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Our goal is to educate the public about social science research on improving inter-group relations across moral divides.